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POSNER'S LESBIANS: NEITHER SEXY NOR
REASONABLE
Ruthann Robson*

P

OSNER's lesbians dress badly, are apt to be homely, and rarely
engage in sexual activities. Posner does offer some consolation: estimates of these poorly dressed, homely, and undersexed creatures have
been greatly exaggerated, and those who do exist tend to be creative.1
Because of my own work on lesbians in law and legal theory, 2 I am
always interested in legal thought that includes a treatment of lesbianism, however scant the treatment might be.3 It is difficult to sustain
*

Associate Professor of Law, CUNY Law School. LL.M., University of California at Berke-

ley, 1990; J.D., Stetson University College of Law, 1979.
1. RicHAPD A. POSNER. SEX AND REASON 91, 99, 106, 123, 294. 304-05 (1992).
2. RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER Tim RULE OF LAW (1992)
[hereinafter ROBSON. LESBIAN (Otrr)LAw]; Ruthann Robson, Incendiary Categories:Lesbian//i-

olence/Law, 2 Tax J. WOMEN & L (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Robson, Incendiary Categories]; Ruthann Robson, Embodiments: The Possibilities of Lesbian Legal Theory in Bodies
Problematized by Postmodernisms and Feminisms, 2 LAw & SExuALrrv (forthcoming 1992);
Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 Wis. WoMiEN's LJ.1 (1990);
Ruthann Robson, Lesbian Jurisprudence?,8 LAw & INEQUALITY 443 (1990); Ruthann Robson,
Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence. Law & Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GO.DEN GATE U L

REv. 567 (1990) [hereinafter Robson, Lavender Bruises]; Ruthann Robson, Lifting Belly: Privacy. Sexuality & Lesbianism, 12 WVOMEN's R's. L REP. 177 (1990); Ruthann Robson & S.E.
Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners,63 TEMP. LQ. 511 (1990).
3. By devoting a commentary to Posner's lesbians, I do not wish to convey the impression that
Posner's work does anything other than marginalize lesbians. Lesbianism is mentioned rarely,
usually in a sentence or two, and always as a comparison to male homosexuality or heterosexuality. The one chapter on homosexuality is almost exclusively about male homosexuality, lesbianism
is mentioned as a deviation from this "norm."
Posner's response to this commentary similarly marginalizes lesbianism, in this instance by
conflating it with feminism. Richard A. Posner, The Radical Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L. Rav. 515 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, Radical]. Posner's conclusion that the
present commentary is written from a "self-identified feminist standpoint," Id. at 515, is erroneous. The standpoint is explicitly and exclusively lesbian. For a discussion of the distinction between lesbian legal theory and feminist legal theory, see RoasoN. LESBIAN (OUr)LAw, supra note
2, at 20-23.
Posner's marginalization of lesbianism and conflation of lesbianism and feminism serve his
strategy of demarcation: there are (good) feminists and there arc (bad) radical feminists, the
latter being identified with lesbianism. See Infra note 24.
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interest, however, when confronted with Posner's legal treatment of lesbians. Sex and Reason is merely a rehearsal of the most superficial
stereotypes of lesbians.
If I were to follow Posner's own methodology, I would assess the
stereotypes that masquerade as facts for their accuracy, or at least
their non-falsifiability.4 This effort would enable me to make conclusions about the viability of Posner's theory of lesbians within his theories of sex. It is tempting to accede to Posner's methodology. Engaging
in factual refutation can be satisfying as well as fun. For example, in
refuting the "fact" that lesbians dress badly,5 I could meticulously footnote articles about the lesbian style wars and fashion features in lesbian/gay magazines like Out!. I could also analyze the current co-option of lesbian style into recent issues of Vogue and Mirabella as well
as the historical appropriation of lesbian style in 1920s Parisian fashion. Yet succumbing to such a temptation trivializes the precarious
state of lesbians within the legal system, even as it is demonstrated by
the law's response to lesbian apparel.
For example, although Posner does not explicate what it means for
anyone to be a "bad" dresser,' among those likely to be placed in this
category is a woman whose dress does not reach sufficient levels of femininity. The gendered nature of valuations of dress can be dangerous
4. See

POSNER,

supra note 1, at 5-7. Posner equates the rejection of his methodology with a

failure to engage with his analysis. Posner, Radical, supra note 3, at 518. My analysis would be

merely derivative, however, if it simply acceded to the assumptions of his analysis. One assumption that I do not share is that it is analytically worthwhile to argue about "facts" such as that
lesbians "on average" are bad dressers, without examining the legal and social conditions that
construct such an inquiry, determine its terms, and result in certain consequences. Similarly, I
decline to argue about many of the suppositions in Posner's response, some of the most offensive of

which have not survived the editing process of his response.
5.

As expressed by Posner:

Then there is the common observation that homosexual men and heterosexual women are
better dressed than either heterosexual men or homosexual women. Since men arc sexu-

ally more aroused by visual cues than women are, we expect both men who are sexually
interested in men, and women who are sexually interested in men, to dress better than
either men who are sexually interested in women or women who are sexually interested in
women.
POSNER, supra note I, at 106.
6. Yet Posner does pontificate on the symbolism of dress:
There are beautiful and ugly bodies, young and old ones, strong and sickly, sturdy and
deformed, but a covering of clothes conceals these differences in our animal endowments,
redirecting attention from the animal parts to the divine part, our soul. The concept of
clothing as egalitarian and spiritual is difficult to recapture in an age when clothing is
used to mark economic differences and to heighten animal charms, yet it lives on in the
few schools that still require their pupils to wear uniforms.
Id. at 226.
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for lesbians. In some cases, for example, gender nonconformity in dress
has been used as evidence not only to prove lesbianism, but also murder.1 Posner does not discuss such cases, or any other ways in which
lesbian dress might be constructed and valued in the social and legal
realms. A book with the stated ambition to present a theory of sexuality that "explains the principal regularities in the practice of sex and in
its social, including legal, regulation" 8 must do better than simply positing lesbians as bad dressers.
Unfortunately, the example of dress is characteristic rather than
atypical of Posner's work. Posner never explores the social and legal
meaning of the stereotypes he advances and never examines the assumptions upon which such stereotypes depend. Instead, Posner's theoretical grounding for sexual stereotypes is a compost of sociobiology
and law and economics: bioeconomics. On such a theoretical ground,
lesbians stand as neither sexy nor reasonable.
Lesbians are not very sexy because, in terms of sociobiological theory, we do not have to be. Optimal sexual strategies-in pursuit of reproducing one's genes as many times as possible-result in a gendered
divide. For men, promiscuity is the method of maximizing reproductive
success. For women, the selection of an appropriate mate will maximize
success ("Would he stick around after impregnating her? Had he the
willingness and the ability to protect her and her offspring?"), but only
if she is monogamous ("a man would be reluctant to extend protection
to a woman who was likely to end up carrying other men's children")."
I leave it to others to dispute Posner's sociobiological "facts" that
women need men for protection and that men are fixated on biological
fatherhood. I am here interested in Posner's "natural" conclusion that
men thus possess a strong sex drive, while women possess a weak one,
and the consequences of that conclusion for lesbians. According to Posner, couple two women and their weak sex drives will dilute the possibilities for passion: "lesbian couples have intercourse less frequently,
on average, than heterosexual couples do, while male couples have intercourse more frequently than heterosexual couples do." 10
Like many of Posner's "facts" about lesbians, this one is unsup7. See Perez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). See also Robson. Lavender
Bruises, supra note 2, at 571-74 (discussing the use of dress as evidence against lesbian
defendants).
8. POSNER, supra note 1, at 2-3.
9. Id. at 91.

10. Id.
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ported by a reference. Elsewhere in Sex and Reason, however, Posner
does cite the notorious Blumstein and Schwartz study, American
Couples, the usual authority for the proposition that lesbian couples are
less sexual than other couples." When Posner does cite the study, he
notes that it "surprisingly" found that the "male homosexual cohabitations were more durable than the lesbian ones." 2 Posner is surprised
because he would expect the lesbian couple, with their weaker sex
drives, to be more faithful and content than a male couple. He asserts
that "since there is less sexual strain in a lesbian union, the prospects
for stable lesbian marriages are better."1 3 Yet Posner does not bother
to refute the study's finding about the relative instability of lesbian
couples, even though this finding is inconsistent with his sociobiological
theories. This lack of refutation must be contrasted with his effort to
refute the study's finding that "male homosexual cohabitations [are]
more stable than heterosexual cohabitations. '"4
Nevertheless, the "fact" that "lesbian couples have intercourse less
frequently" than other couples merits some interrogation. I might agree
with it; I might even argue that lesbians never have intercourse. As
usually understood, "intercourse" as a sexual term connotes penile penetration of a vagina. Posner himself, elsewhere in Sex and Reason, specifically limits "intercourse" to such a definition, although admitting of
a "lesbian simulacra of intercourse such as the penetration of the vagina by an artificial penis."1 5 Yet, in all my private and public conversations with countless lesbians, in all my listening to lesbians argue
about sex and politics, in all my reading of lesbian theory, novels, stories, articles, letters, and poetry, and even in my own sexual encounters,
I cannot remember ever having heard even a single lesbian ever describe a sexual relation with a woman as "having intercourse."
Whether lesbians are including a dildo within their particular sexual
practices or not, they simply do not use the word "intercourse" to describe sexual relations among themselves.
I am not simply suggesting that Posner is guilty of poor or inconsistent word choice. I am also suggesting that "intercourse"-and even
"sex"-may not be as neatly quantifiable a phenomenon as Posner as11.

PHILIP BLUMSTEIN

& PEPPER SCHWARTZ. AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK. SEX

(1983).
12. POSNER, supra note 1, at 306 n.41.
13. Id. at 306.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 21. Posner also writes: "[V]aginal intercourse is a close substitute for sodomy, but
one available only to heterosexuals." Id. at 291.

1993]

ON SEX AND REASON

sumes. For example, in a critique of the American Couples study, lesbian theorist Marilyn Frye ponders the violence done to lesbian sexual
experience as lesbians attempted to answer survey questions about how
frequently they "had sex":
My guess is that different individuals figured it out differently.
Some might have counted a two- or three-cycle evening as one
"time" they "had sex"; some might have counted that as two
or three "times." Some may have counted as "times" only the
times both partners had orgasms; some may have counted as
"times" those occasions on which at least one had an orgasm;
those who do not have orgasms or have them far more rarely
than they "have sex" may not have figured orgasms into the
calculations; perhaps some counted as a "time" every episode
in which both touched the other's vulva more than fleetingly
and not for something like a health examination. For some, to
count every reciprocal touch of the vulva would have made
them count as "having sex" more than most people with a job
or work would dream of having time for; how do we suppose
those individuals counted "times"? Is there any good reason
why they should not count all those as "times"? Does it depend upon how fulfilling it was? Was anybody else counting
by occasions of fulfillment? 6
Frye's posing of the question of fulfillment leads her to examine the
methods by which heterosexual couples counted times they "had sex":
"By orgasms? By whose orgasms?" 1 Referring to another finding that
85% of long-term married heterosexual couples report it takes them
eight minutes to "have sex," Frye speculates that "in a very large number" of those "times" the woman did not experience orgasm. Frye further speculates that neither the woman's pleasure nor her orgasms were
pertinent in most of the heterosexuals' counting and reporting of the
'
times they "had sex." 18
Just as Frye's ultimate point is not that the American Couples
study is incorrect, my point is not that Posner's "fact" that lesbian
couples have "less intercourse" is inaccurate, or at least falsifiable.10
16. Marilyn Frye, Lesbian "'Sex," in LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES 305, 307-03
(Jeffner Allen ed., 1990). This essay originally appeared at 35 SINISTER WISDO!, 46 (1988) and is
reprinted in MARILYN FRYE. WILLFUL VIRGIN 109 (1992).
17. Frye, supra note 16, at 308.
18. Id. at 306.

19. As stated, I do not adopt Posner's methodology, and thus, do not attempt to falsify Pos-
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The problem with Posner's theory is much more profound. Just as Frye
concludes that the American Couples study employs a simplistic male
perspective on what it means to "have sex," I am arguing that Posner's
work reflects an overly simplistic and exclusively male perspective on
what it means to "have intercourse" or "sex." One consequence of such
a perspective is that inaccurate facts might be deduced, but more importantly the perspective determines what facts will be deduced: I am
not as worried about wrong answers as about erroneous questions. An
inquiry that seeks to quantify lesbian sex and compare it to quantified
As Marilyn
heterosexual or gay male sex is misguided in its inception.
20
Frye states, it does "violence" to lesbian existence.
Further, this quantification of lesbian sexuality protrudes into
other areas of inquiry. For example, the conclusion that lesbians are
not very sexual forestalls any serious inquiry into the existence of laws
prohibiting lesbianism or the prosecution of lesbians for sexual transgressions. Posner simply repeats the clich6 that, historically, lesbianism
was rarely, if ever, criminalized and lesbians were rarely, if ever, prosecuted.2 1 As I have argued elsewhere, there is evidence of both the existence of criminal penalties and the imposition of those penalties, including executions.2 There is also evidence that lesbian sexuality was
punished under other rubrics, such as vagrancy or prostitution, within a
system of social and legal regulation that punished all expressions of
women's sexuality-including lesbianism-as generic deviancy. 3
The linking of all unacceptable sexual expression on the part of
women, including lesbians, is not merely an historic link. If one takes
seriously Posner's claim that much of the social hostility towards
"homosexuals" presently encoded in legal regulation needs to be, at the
very least, reconsidered, then the "fact" of lesbians as "not very sexual" may be perceived as a mandate, or at least a reason, to regulate
lesbian sexuality. Another sort of deviance is created, justifying legal
regulation of sexual lesbians, not for their lesbianism but for their "excess" sexual expression. Such a legal regime imposing limits has the
capacity not only to justify punishment, but also to domesticate lesbian
ner's factual conclusions and thereby discredit Posner's theories of lesbians within his theories of
sex.
20. Frye, supra note 16, at 307. See also Robson, Incendiary Categories, supra note 2 (discussing the various types of violence done to lesbians).
21. POSNER, supra note 1, at 70, 300.
22. ROBSON. LESBIAN (OuT)LAW, supra note 2, at 29-45; Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, supra note 2.
23. ROBSON. LESBIAN (OuT)LAW, supra note 2, at 29-45.
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existence and sexuality, by making us believe that the legalized version

of lesbian sexuality is the correct, or only, one.24 As lesbian theorist
Joan Nestle reminds us:

It is tempting to some Lesbians to see themselves as the clean
sexual deviant, to disassociate themselves from public sexual
activity, multiple partners, and intergenerational sex. While
this may be the choice for some of us, it is not the reality of
many others, not now and not in the past. Lesbian purity, a
public image that drapes us in the cloak of monogamous longterm relationships, discrete at-home social gatherings and a
basic urge to recreate the family, helps no one .... [B]y al-

lowing ourselves to be portrayed as the good deviant, the respectable deviant, we lose more than we will ever gain. We
lose the complexity of our own lives ....11

The complexity of lesbian lives, including lesbian sexualities, is lost
*inSex and Reason. Our sexualities are obscured by a morass of sociobiological theory that prefers the simplistic to the complex. We
emerge as stereotypes crafted with a male perspective, when we emerge

at all. It is no wonder that Posner's lesbians are not very sexy.
According to Posner, not only are lesbians not very sexy, we are
not very reasonable. Lesbians are not very reasonable because in terms
of law and economics theory, we do not act rationally to maximize our
benefits and reduce our costs. 26 Obviously, given the social and legal
24. For a discussion of the theory of domestication, see ROBSON. LESBIAN (OuT)LAw. supra
note 2, at 18-19. An example of domestication, as well as the law's potential to demarcate good
lesbians and bad ones based upon sexual activities, occurs in the "marriage" debates that occur
within the legal arena and within lesbian communities. One persuasive argument is that marriage
creates such a divide, defining "married" lesbians as good lesbians, monogamous partners whose
sexuality is circumspect, and nonmarried lesbians as bad lesbians, predators whose sexuality is
excessive. See id. at 125-27.
Although Posner professes to be baffled by such an argument, Posner, Radical, supra note 3,
at 522-23, his own rhetoric demonstrates this demarcation strategy. In the opening paragraphs of
his response, Posner opines that, "properly understood," feminism encompasses (good) feminists
like John Stuart Mill, but that there exists a "temporary dominance" of (bad) radical feminists.
like the present commentators, who are "sectarian," "faintly nasty," and careless reasoners. Id. at
515-16. The bad feminists do not agree with Posner, one assumes that good feminists welcome his
perspectives. As an intellectual, Posner has the ability to work toward the eradication of the dominance of "radical feminists" through his theorizing. As a member of the federal judiciary, Posner
has the ability to enforce his assumptions about lesbian sexuality through his judgments.
25.

JOAN NESTLE. A RESTRICTED COUNTRY 123 (1987).

26. Although Posner explicitly states that the law and economics portion of his theory is not
dependent on an acceptance of sociobiological theories, POSNER, supra note I, at 110, much of his
evaluation of benefits and costs is linked to "facts" supported by sociobiological rationales.
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regulation of lesbian and gay male sexual expression, it does not maximize one's benefits and reduce one's costs to pursue "homosexuality."
Posner shares his conclusion that "even in a tolerant society the life
prospects of a homosexual-not in every case, of course, but on average-are, especially for the male homosexual, grimmer than those of
an otherwise identical heterosexual. ' 27 Grimness, like so many other
qualitative and subjective judgments, is accorded an almost quantifiable precision. Yet the irrational unhappiness of homosexual choice
leads Posner to the conclusion that society should not place legal and
social obstacles in the "path of the homosexual," but should "remove
those obstacles in order to alleviate gratuitous suffering. 2 8 Posner's
seemingly rational response to the irrational choice of homosexuals dissipates, however, in the subsequent passages. Posner's focus here, as in
so much of Sex and Reason, is exclusively male, and in this case he
focuses on male homosexuality. I quote at length, in order to convey
Posner's cost-benefit rationalizations:
It becomes a reason for repression only if repression can
change homosexual preference, incipient or settled, into heterosexual preference at acceptable cost and thereby make persons who would otherwise become or remain homosexuals happier. There is no reason to think that repression,
psychotherapy, behavior modification, or any other technique
of law or medicine can do so in a large enough number of
cases to warrant the costs ....
Maybe we should just be patient; science, which has
worked so many wonders, may someday, perhaps someday
soon, discover a "cure" for homosexuality. I suspect, however,
that most persons who are already homosexual will not want
to be cured, not because they are oblivious to the advantages
of being heterosexual but because being homosexual is part of
their identity.... But if the hypothetical cure for homosexuality were something that could be administered-costlessly, risklessly, without side effects-before a child had become aware
of his homosexual propensity, you can be sure that the child's
parents would administer it to him, believing, probably correctly, that he would be better off, not yet having assumed a
27.
28.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
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homosexual identity.

9

As this passage indicates, part of Posner's tolerance is predicated upon
an assumption that homosexual preference is innate. Yet as is made
clear by the passage's continuation, Posner does not subscribe to a theory of immutable preference for all homosexuals. According to Posner,
parents may be able to prevent the "formation of homosexual preference" by "discouraging gender-nonconforming behavior at its outset
(later is too late)," including not "condoning 'sissyish' behavior in infancy." 0 Posner's underlying thesis is that while a person's sexual preference is given, not chosen, the decision to engage in a particular act is
a rational choice made in light of pertinent costs and benefits. 3 '
Unlike their male counterparts, however, Posner's lesbians rarely
possess any innate preference. This lack is explained by sociobiological
theories of evolution,3 one empirical study of sexual preference concordance in twins,33 and a gendered congenital disparity. The minimal
numbers of women with a preference toward lesbianism maximizes the
"search costs" of those lesbians. A comparison of such search costs
with the benefits to the searcher grounds the relationship between sex
and rationality from the law and economics perspective. As Posner hy29.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 308. A portion of the omitted text is a parenthetical referencing

Foucault's well-known conclusion that homosexuality first became linked to identity in the nineteenth century, citing 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT. THE HtsToRY OF SEuALUTY- AN IN'mODUCTIO.V 43,
101 (R6bert Hurley trans., 1978). Another portion of the omitted text attempts an analogy between Jewish identity and "homosexual" identity, accomplishing only an offensive digression:

Jews are conscious of the advantages of converting, changing their name, and otherwise
obliterating as far as possible the traces of their ancestry; and many Jews might if asked
say that they would rather have been born into another group. But most of them do not
convert, because (I conjecture) their being Jewish is part of their identity, so conversion
would have a taste of death to it-like replacing one's body with another. albeit hand-

somer, one.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 308.

30. Id. at 308-09.
31. Id. at 87.
32. Posner states: "Women who shun men cause a reduction in the birth rate, that rate being
limited by the number of wombs, not by the number of penises; so in the evolutionary era, when
there was no artificial insemination, lesbian preference would have tended to be selected out." Id.
at 99. "[G]enetic explanation for lesbianism is weak, because in the evolutionary priod, which
apparently was characterized by a high degree of interpersonal violence, to have additional male

protectors may well have done more for a child's chances of survival than to have additional
female protectors." Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).

33. Posner cites a study that found "no twin concordance among female homosexuals," but
admits that "the sample of female twins was very small (four pairs)." Id. at 102 nA0.
34. "Maybe the wires accidentally get crossed at birth in some more or less stable percentage
of newborns, especially boys because of the greater complexity of the male reproductive system."
Id. at 101 n.35.
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pothesizes (again equating homosexuality with male homosexuality), if
"a village of one hundred persons contains a single homosexual," then
"as long as he confines himself to the village, his search costs for a
homosexual relationship will be infinite, unless other homosexuals visit
the village. He can travel to other villages, but his search costs will still
be high since they include the cost of travel. '35 Posner uses the centrality of search costs for sex to explain homosexual urbanization, but presumably urbanization is no remedy for lesbians because Posner concludes that only 1%-and not 10% as is widely accepted-of women
are lesbians.36 Lesbians are thus confined to a global village in which
search costs approach the infinite, and thus the irrational. Further, the
benefits of any successful search are not high because Posner's lesbians
are not very attractive, adding to the irrationality of the entire
endeavor. a7
Yet lesbians may be the most rational women of all. According to
Posner, women who dislike men may turn away from men and become
practicing lesbians, "opportunistic" rather than "real" (innate) lesbians. 8 Thus, the fear that if "legal and social inhibitors of homosexual
activity are relaxed, young men and women will succumb to the blandishments of homosexual sex and a homosexual style of life" is "misplaced" in the case of men but is "a little more plausible with respect
to women. '" 9 This deliberate commitment to lesbianism could-and
perhaps, should-be subject to social and legal control.40
Posner, however, maintains throughout Sex and Reason that lesbianism, as well as other "deviant" sexual practices, should not be subject to rigorous legal and social control. For some conservatives this
may be cause for Posner's censure; for some liberals this may be cause
for Posner's acceptance. My own criteria for assessing any work that
considers lesbianism within the context of law is whether such work
contributes toward the survival of lesbians, both as individuals and as
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 128, 294-95.
Although "homely women should have relatively better lesbian than heterosexual opportu-

nities because women tend to place less value on good looks in a sexual partner than men do," Id.
at 123, Posner sets the value of sex with an "attractive" person higher than the value of sex with

an unattractive person.
38. Id. at 179.
39. Id. at 299.
40. Thus, although Posner does not explicitly so conclude, because lesbians are more rational
than gay men, the law could criminalize lesbianism as a rational deterrent, while not similarly
criminalizing male homosexuality.
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identity. 41 Ultimately, Posner's work does neither.
While it may be soothing that Posner eschews the prosecution of
lesbianism and proposes sex as a morally indifferent subject, his sociobiological grounding is disturbingly sexist and heterosexist. Posner's
lesbians exist as aberrations in an evolutionary scheme that mandates
that attractive women serve strong men. The law and economics version of sexuality and law is a laissez-faire one; generally the law should
not interfere, either positively or negatively, with lesbianism. 2 In fact,
such interference is not necessary because Posner's lesbians, as neither
sexy nor rational, can be expected to price ourselves out of the sexual
market, and out of existence.
Fortunately, Posner's lesbians are not the lesbians I have known,
read about, or theorized. For an exposition of lesbian life and theory
that is not simply formulaic, a reader would do well to consider other
texts.43 Perhaps a future commentary in the Connecticut Law Review
also would do well to consider other texts: ones that advance, challenge,
41. As I have written elsewhere, I am ultimately concerned about how the law impacts upon
lesbian survival:
By survival I mean two things. First, the very daily survival that depends upon the necessities of life like food, shelter, work, safety and love. The law denies, or makes very difficult, this type of survival when the rule of law sanctions discrimination in employment
and housing, removal of our children, and toleration of violence against us.
Second, I mean our survival as lesbians. The law denies, or makes more difficult, this
less tangible sort of survival when it defines our lesbianism for us, when it promises us
protection and acceptance if we can argue ourselves into its categories.

RosoN, LESBIAN (OuT)LAwv, supra note 2, at 11-12. I do not disagree with Posner's assessment
of this project as "frankly political." Posner, Radical, supra note 3, at 522. However, Posner's
own project of extending his economic theories to the realm of sexualitis is similarly political.
though perhaps less frank.
42. Posner posits certain exceptions, notably the law's permissible deprivation of custody to
any lesbian mother who believes lesbianism (or male homosexuality) would be a plausible option
for her child. POSNER, supra note 1, at 419.
43. Some recent volumes include LILLIAN FADEnstN.ODD GIRLS AND Twt.zuoirr LovEs. A
HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TwENTIEH CENTURY AMiERICA (1991); SARAH LUCIA HOAGLAND.
LESBIAN ETmICS: TOWARD NEw VALUE (1988); JULIA PENELOPE. CALL ME LESBIAN LESBIAN
LIvEs. LESBIAN THEORY (1992); MINNIE BRUCE PRATr, REBELLION; EssAws 1980-1991 (1991);
JUDITH ROOF, A LURE OF KNOWLEDGE. LESBIAN SEXUALITY AND THEORY (1991). Some of the
many recent important anthologies include, DYKEsCAPES: SHORT FICTION By LESBIANS (Tina Partillo ed., 1991); INVERSIONS: WRITING BY DYKES. QUEERS AND LESBIANS (Betsy Warland ed.,
1991); LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES (Jeffner Allen ed., 1990); LESBIAN TEXTS AND
CoNTE-rS (Karla Jay & Joanne Glasgow eds., 1990); OUR lUvES LESBIAN PERSONAL WWRTINGS
(Frances Rooney ed., 1991); PIECE OF MY HEART: A LESBIAN OF COLOUR ANTiOLOGY (Makeda
Silvera ed., 1991); POLITICS OF THE HEART: A LESBIAN PARENTING Am'hOLOG (Sandra Pollack
& Jeanne Vaughn eds., 1987). There are also many significant, informative, and enjoyable no-els
and volumes of short fiction available at any feminist, lesbian/gay or independent/progressive
bookstore.
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and provoke our theorizing rather than one that invites us only to entertain or refute its insipid stereotypes.

